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La crisis, como los “cócteles explosivos” se producen mezclando poderosos ingredientes. Y 
la Argentina, desde 1823, ha hecho 26 “mezclas” que terminaron “explotando” ¿Cuántos 
ingredientes se necesitan para hacer un “cóctel explosivo”? ¿Cuáles son esos ingredientes? 
¿Cuál es la mezcla más cara? Este trabajo busca identificar, mediante el método de 
regression tree análisis, las distintas “recetas” que generaron crisis económicas en Argentina 
a través de su historia. El trabajo también mide los costos de las crisis argentinas en 
términos de pérdidas de producto: Para ello, utilizamos la metodología sugerida por el FMI 
(1998) 
Encontramos que hay cuatro mezclas explosivas, siendo ingredientes claves el Déficit 
Fiscal, la sobrevaluación del Tipo de Cambio Real, la tasa de crecimiento de los depósitos 
reales y el ratio de Deuda Externa a Exportaciones. Las crisis más frecuentes son aquellas 
que tienen al elevado déficit fiscal como ingrediente excluyente, aunque el costo medio de 
las  crisis es mayor cuando se mezclan déficit fiscales moderados con fuertes caídas en la 
tasa de cambio de los depósitos reales, presumiblemente porque generan además una crisis 
bancaria. 
Abstract 
Crises, like “explosive cocktails” are made by mixing powerful ingredients. Argentina has 
made 26 “explosive cocktails” since 1823. How many ingredients are needed to make an 
“explosive cocktail”? Which are these ingredients? Which is the most expensive mix? This 
paper attempts to identify the different recipes that ended up in economic crisis throughout 
argentine economic history by means of the regression tree analysis technique. The paper 
also measures Argentina’s crises costs in terms output losses. We follow the methodology 
used by the IMF (1998), that is, computing cumulative output lost relative to trend.  
It is found that there are four explosive mixes, having Fiscal Deficit, Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation, Bank Deposit growth rate decline and the ratio of External Debt to Exports as 
the key ingredients. The most frequent crises are those having high fiscal deficit; though 
average cost is higher for crises mixing moderate fiscal with strong decline in Real Bank 
Deposits, presumably entailing banking crises. 
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Hundred of millions of people who expected rapidly rising standards of living 
have seen their living standards fall, hundreds of thousands if not millions of 
children have been forced to drop out of school and go to work, hundreds of 
billions of dollars of apparent wealth has been lost, the stability of large 
nations has been called into question, and the United States has made its 
largest nonmilitary foreign policy related financial commitments since the 
Marshall Plan.  
Lawrence Summers,  
International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention and Cures 
American Economic Review (2000) 
 
Currency crises are quite expensive; a history of recurrent crises even more 
so. The costs arise in three ways: a substantial increase in public debt 
associated with a crisis, a disruption and loss of output, and the possibility of 
a socially controversial redistribution of income and wealth 
Rudi Dornbusch  
A Primer on Emerging Market Crises  
NBER Working Paper 8376 (2001) “ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The flavor is bitter. Consequences are deleterious: output drops, reserves drain, domestic 
money depreciation, income distribution worsening. Depending on the ingredients, it can also 
provoke political order disruption, and institutional changes. The name of the drink is crisis 
and Argentina has become addicted to it. 
Since Independence Argentina experienced 26 economic crises. That is, one crisis every 6 
and a half years, more than any other country in the world. The record includes different 
varieties and mixes: currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. What are the ingredients 
of such explosive cocktails? Are they made with import components, such as increases in 
                                                 
* This paper builds on Cerro and Meloni (2003) and Amado, Cerro and Meloni (2004). We are grateful to the 
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this paper. Naturally, all errors are ours. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Consejo de Investigaciones 
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international interest rates, changes in the international capital market conditions, and 
declining price of exports? Or they are also obtained with national condiments such as fiscal 
deficit, high indebtness and real exchange rate overvaluation?  
How many ingredients are needed to make an explosive cocktail? Which is the most 
expensive mix? The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we identify the different recipes 
that ended up in economic crisis throughout argentine economic history by performing 
regression tree analysis. We use fifteen financial and macroeconomic variables suggested 
by the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Secondly, we attempt to list all costs provoked by crisis and measure Argentina’s crises 
costs in terms of output losses. We follow the methodology used by the IMF (1998), that is, 
computing cumulative output lost relative to trend. 
This paper is organized in five sections. In the following section we summarize the 
methodology carried out to date crises in Argentina, as performed by Cerro and Meloni 
(2003), and highlights some historical events that were key to understand those crises. In 
section III we identify the ingredients of “explosive cocktails” by means of the Regression 
Tree Method. Section IV evaluates the costs of currency crisis in terms of output losses and 
recovery time and discusses some other costs caused by crises. Finally, section V is 
reserved for concluding remarks. 
 
II. CRISES IDENTIFICATION 
Currency crises
1 are generally defined as situations in which speculative attacks on the 
exchange value of the currency result in devaluation (or sharp depreciation) of the currency
2. 
The extended empirical literature proposes two alternative methods to identify currency 
crisis. The simplest one, searches for substantial nominal currency devaluations as 
performed by Frankel and Rose (1996). A more laborious approach, though still simple, is to 
construct a market pressure index that takes into account not only exchange rate changes 
but also movements in international reserves and interest rates. This is the approach 
followed by Cerro and Meloni (2003) to identify crises in Argentina from 1823 to 2003
3 
4.  
The so-called Market Turbulent Index (MTI) is the sum of three rates of change: international 
reserves, exchange rate and interest rate weighted by the inverse of the respective standard 
deviation to avoid the most variable component dominates the index movements. 
Algebraically, 
 
Where the symbol 
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ represents the rate of growth of the variable; e is the exchange rate, R 
stands for international reserves, i is the domestic interest rate and σ σ σ σe,  σ σ σ σR,  σ σ σ σI are the 
standard deviations of the growth rate of the exchange rate, international reserves and 
domestic interest rate, respectively. 
The Market Turbulence Index (MTI) stems from the idea that market pressure increases 
when exchange rate devaluates (rises), when interest rates increase and when international 
reserves fall. Under a floating exchange rate regime, we expect abrupt increases in the 
                                                 
1 The literature on financial crises usually distinguishes four broad types of financial or economic crises. (a) 
Currency crises (b) Banking Crises (c) Systemic financial crises (d) Foreign debt crisis 
2 See IMF (1998) 
3 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz (1994) pioneered this approach. 
4 Sansón (2004) constructs different market pressure indexes to study Argentine crises. 
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exchange rate as crisis develops, while under a fixed exchange rate, prior to devaluation, 
interest rates increase and international reserves diminish
5. 
Depending on the deviation from the MTI, crises were classified as very deep (or crashes), 
deep and mild
6. Table 1, Panels A and B, shows the behavior of the MTI and its components 
for the period 1823-1913, computed from annual data (Panel A), and 1914 –2002, calculated 
from monthly data, (Panel B). Computations from annual data might result in underestimation 
of the number of crises, since episodes occurred within a given year cannot be detected by 
the index. Likewise, due to data availability, from 1823 to 1874 the index includes only the 
exchange rate.  
 
Table 1. Panel A. Crises in Argentina: 1823- 1913. Annual data 
Crisis/year  Depreciation/ 
Devaluation (%) 
International 
Reserves (%)  Crisis Type 
1826/27 253.0  na  Very  Deep 
1829/30 127.8  na    Mild 
1839/40 153.9  na  Deep 
1846 45.7  na  Mild 
1876 5.8  -67.4  Mild 
1885 37.0  113.8  Deep 
1889/91 177.0  -28.6  Very  Deep 
Source: Cerro and Meloni (2003)  
Note: See Appendix for details.  
Before the national organization period (starting in 1862) crises were associated with 
international conflicts that resulted in blockades to the port of Buenos Aires and hence in 
dramatic falls in the revenues from import tariffs, the main source of financing the public 
budget, which in turn was high and growing due to military spending. The country suffered 
three blockades. The first one, in 1826, during the war against Brazil (1825 – 1827) and two 
more in 1838 – 1840, performed by the French, and in 1845 – 1848 carried out by the 
combined French and British forces. 
On the other hand, the three episodes dated in the last quarter of the century, the crises of 
1876, 1885 and 1889/91, were good examples of inconsistency between monetary and fiscal 
policy. During the Sarmiento administration (1868-74) expenditures had grown considerably 
not only because the war with Paraguay and various conflicts in the provinces demanded 
military outlays but also due to the ambitious public investments plan
7. The country had a 
convertibility regime and the adverse international conditions
8 that started in 1873 that led to 
the contraction in the gold-backed money supply, obliged the government to sell the stock of 
metallic notes and to reduce public sector expenditures. But the attempts to sterilize the 
negative effects of gold outflows failed and finally convertibility was abandoned in May 1876. 
The crisis of 1885 had similar features. By July 1883 the paper-peso exchanged at par with 
the gold-peso
9. The period of convertibility lasted only seventeen months. By the end of 
                                                 
5 Typically, governments spend international reserves or increase interest rates to defend the currency or 
moderate exchange rates changes.  
6 See Appendix I for details. 
7 Cortés Conde (1989)  -pages 87 and 113- describes the huge increment in expenditures during Sarmiento years 
and the austerity measures taken by Avellaneda. 
8 Delargy and Goodhart (1999) consider the 1873 crises as the first truly international one. The epicenter of the 
crisis was the Austrian Bourse, which received the impact of an investment boom triggered by a huge indemnity 
paid to Germany after the Franco –Prussian war. 
 
9 In 1881 the Congress voted a currency reform law that introduced a bimetallic standard system. AAEP 05  5 
 
December 1884, the banks of issue did not stand ready to sell gold at par to all who offered 
the metallic note. Hence, in March 1885 the federal government decreed the inconvertibility 
of paper money. 
The 1889/91 crisis was one of the deepest in Argentine history. The root of the crisis can be 
found in the poor administration of President Juárez Celman, characterized by the 
outrageous increased in public expenditure and the high level of indebtedness, both external 
and domestic. In this period, the government created the National Guarantee Banks (Bancos 
Nacionales Garantidos) that is, banks entitled to print their own money, which lead to huge 
increments in the monetary base. High levels of public indebtedness coupled with easy 
monetary policy brought about devaluation expectations, with the consequently fall in specie 
reserves. In 1890 most private and public banks broke and, given the impossibility of facing 
their obligations, a generalized default was declared. 
Panel B shows the behavior of the MTI and its components during the 19 crises ocurred from 
the beginning of the WWI to the present. There were 4 crises episodes rated as very deep, 7 
as deep and 8 as mild.  
 
Table 1. Panel B. Crises in Argentina: 1914- 2003. Monthly data 
Rate of Change (%)  Market Turbulence Index 
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1914 0.7  -15.4 16.7    2    1  3  Deep 
1918/19 0.1  1.1  27.6    1 2  1  10  Mild 
1920/21 48.2  0.0  10.2      2  5  11  Mild 
1929/31 79.4  -48.9  28.4  3  6  7  4  22  Very 
Deep 
1937/38 18.6  -28.0  11.9      4  5  14  Mild 
1948/49  247.4 -44.7    1  1  4  2 16  Deep 
1950/51 114.7  -30.6      1  2  1  8  Mild 
1955  66.7 -40.7        1  3 4  Mild 
1958 97.6  -78.0   1  1  2  2  10  Deep 
1962 76.3  -75.7   1  1    5  10  Deep 
1964/65  103.5 -63.5     1  2  5 13  Mild 
1971  134.1 -73.9         3 14  Deep 
1975/76 2282.1  -80.9    2  4  7  2  21  Very 
Deep 
1981/82 2999.3  -67.0  151.0  1  2  7  1  24  Deep 
1983/84
/85  9958.6 -70.0 214.0      8  6  22  Mild 
1986/87
/88  1498.7 -74.2 359.5    3  3  5  23  Deep 
1989/90
/91  68935.6 -66.1 896.4  11  1  2  1  26  Very 
Deep 
1995 0.0  -40.2  150.0    2  2  0  4  Mild 
2001/02  268.5 -67.2  737.9  9  1  3  4 25  Very 
Deep 
Source: Cerro and Meloni (2003)  
Notes: See Appendix for details.  
(1) Crises amplitude results from computing the numbers of months from the beginning to the end of the crisis. AAEP 05  6 
 
 
The behavior of the variables deserves some comments. First, devaluations/ depreciations 
during crises increased over time, but clearly the 1948/49 crisis stands out for the magnitude 
of the devaluation, 247%, unusual for those years. It can also be observed that the 1975/76 
crash constitutes a hinge. Before that crisis, devaluations ranged between two-digits and the 
lower three-digits and from 1975/76 climbed to the four-digits, reaching a peak in the 1989/91 
crash. The smallest devaluations were those corresponding to the 1914 and 1918/19 crises 
with percentages lower than 1%. It is worthwhile to remark that the 1914 crisis had a peak in 
August 1914, when WWI forced President Victorino de la Plaza
10 to suspend the full 
convertibility of the peso after 13 years of gold standard regime. 
Second, international reserves drainage also shows a growing trend, with percentages below 
the 50% until the 1955 mild crisis and almost doubling for the following crises. To illustrate 
the magnitudes involved in each period, notice that the 1929/31 crash implied a 49% fall in 
international reserves, the largest in the first half of the century, but modest if compared to 
most of the mild and deep crises in the lasts 50 years. 
Third, the interest rates also exhibits two periods clearly distinguishable. For those crises 
before 1940, the growth rate never surpassed 30% while for the crises in the last quarter of 
the XX century the three-digit rate of change was the norm. 
Forth, except for the 1929/31 crash, that lasts 22 months, the amplitude of crises before 
1975/76 crash only occasionally reached the year, while for the rest of the century the 
amplitude was in the neighborhood of two years, with the sole exception of the so called 
Tequilla crisis in 1994 with four months duration.   
It can also be observed that, based on the MTI components,  the 1918/19 crisis was the 
mildest, with modest increases in the interest rates and almost no changes in exchange rates 
and international reserves. The deepest was the 1989/91 with uncontrolled increases in 
exchange rates and interest rates and huge reserve losses. 
 
III. SEARCHING FOR COCKTAIL  INGREDIENTS:  AN APPLICATION OF THE 
REGRESSION TREE APPROACH 
As we see from the previous section the magnitude of the fluctuations involved during crises 
in Argentina lead us to ask which are the factors involved in such performances, or to follow 
the analogy of the title of the paper, which are the ingredients of the “explosive cocktails” 
made in Argentina?
11   
In order to answer the question we will carry out regression tree classification analysis.  
Regression Tree Analysis 
The regression tree analysis is a non-parametric, data classification technique, aimed at 
identifying the variables involved in each crisis separately. The output of regression tree 
method is a set of terminal nodes, called tree. Each terminal node characterizes a crisis or a 
group of crises. The method considers an initial split of the data into two subgroups, favoring 
homogeneity within each group and heterogeneity between the groups. This split is repeated 
in sequential form until each subset terminates either when there is no impurity reduction 
from splitting or when the number of observations in the cell is less than a specified number 
of rows (or observations). Many different criteria can be defined for selecting the best split at 
each node. However, the properties of the final tree selected are insensitive to the choice of 
the splitting rule. Variable misclassification costs and prior distributions can be incorporated 
into the splitting structure in a natural way.  
                                                 
10 President Roque Sáenz Peña died in 1914 and was succeeded by Vice- President Victorino de la Plaza. 
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Before applying the regression tree technique to the data set we choose the following 
parameters to build the decision tree:  
1.  Predictor variable: years of crises (plus the year preceding the crisis year) and non-
crises, according to the MTI. Thus, in the sample, there are 65 crises years and 115 
non-crisis years. 
2.  Default method used to split nodes in the tree: Gini splitting.  
3.  Minimum size node to split: 40 observations (or rows). This constraint results in a 
smaller tree (fewer nodes), which gives greater predictive accuracy than larger trees. 
There is a trade–off between the size of the tree and the misclassification rate (Bayes 
probability error). As the tree grows (more nodes) the method gets a better 
description of each crises but prediction is poorer.   
4.  Probability of crisis: 0.3. From the MTI classification we have 65 crises years 
(including the year preceding each crisis), which means that probability of crisis is 
36%. A sensitivity analysis was carried out and the best fit was achieved with 0.3.  
5.  Misclassification costs: 1. This means that the cost of misclassify a crisis year as a 
non-crisis year is the same as committing the mistake of classifying a non-crisis year 
as a crisis year.  
6.  Cross-validation: 10 fold. V-fold cross validation is a technique to determine the 
optimal tree size. V-fold cross validation performs independent tree size test without 
requiring separate test datasets and without reducing the data used to build the tree 
to determine the optimal tree size. The learning dataset is partitioned into some 
number of groups called “folds”. For instance, assume 10 partitions (the default 
number) are created. In each case, 90% of the data is used to build a test tree and 
10% is held back for independent testing, that is, the classification error for this 10% 
is computed. This process is repeated 10 times, building 10 separate test tree. Then, 
their classification error rate as a function of tree size is averaged. This averaged 
error rate for a particular tree size is the cross validation cost. The tree size that 
produces the minimum cross validation cost is the optimal tree size. 
The regression tree method applied to currency crises has a couple of advantages when 
compared to other traditional methods. First, it does not impose the same functional form to 
all crises such as logit and probit models. Second, the probability of crisis augments as the 
number of variables indicating vulnerability increases. For example, an expanding domestic 
credit may be explosive with a convertible fixed exchange rate and with capital inflow 
reversal. 
The classification also identifies which subset of early warnings is most important to classify 
and predict crises. Interestingly, decision tree also handle missing data values in the sample 
using surrogate splitters, which are back-up rules that closely mimic the action of primary 
splitting rules. For example, the GDP growth is the predictor variable whose splits most 
closely mimic the split of the primary splitter: bank deposit growth. The construction of a 
regression tree is described in Amado, Cerro and Meloni (2004) 
Empirical Results: recipes for crises 
Previous to run the Regression Tree method, we classified each year as crises and non-
crises years according to the MTI. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 
if the MTI identifies the event as crisis and 0 otherwise. We did not distinguish among crises 
intensity, i.e. very deep, deep, and mild. Independent variables were chosen from the 
prescription of the first, second, third generation models and the so-called sudden stops 
theory
12. A total of fifteen indicators were used. The variables emphasized by the first-
                                                 
12 The theoretical models on the causes of financial crises are catalogued into three generations: first, second and 
third. Recently, sudden stops models have surged as another source of currency crises explanation. See Cerro 
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generation model are Fiscal Deficit (% GDP), Public Expenditure Growth, Excess Real M1 
Balances/GDP. Likewise, Second Generation Models stress Exports Growth, GDP Growth, 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation, Current Account Deficit. Third Generation Models 
consider the following as key variable: M2/Reserves Growth, M2 Multiplier Growth, 
M2/Reserves, M2 Multiplier, Bank Deposits Growth, External Debt/Exports. While, for 
Sudden Stop models variables are Nominal LIBOR, Nominal LIBOR Growth. This list of 
variables only pretends to show where the focus of the main theories at stake is. More than 
testing the relevance of particular models, we look for the recipe of crises in Argentina 
throughout history
13. We do not make a tournament among rival theories; we are interesting 
in the ingredients of crises. 
The results of regression tree classification are reported in Figure 1. It is found that 
observations are assigned to four terminal nodes
14.  
Figure 1. Regression Tree Analysis: Argentina 1823- 2003. 
 
 
The final classification rule identified four variables with overall importance greater than 50%: 
Fiscal Deficit (-1), Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (-1), Bank Deposit Growth and the 
ratio of External Debt to Exports (-1). Notice that all four can be considered as domestic 
condiments contributing to crises
15. In the fifth place comes the Nominal LIBOR (39% of 
importance) the only variable that can be mentioned as the imported ingredient of some 
“explosive cocktails”.  
Notice also the ability of the indicators lagged, compared to those contemporaneous, to 
predict crises one year in advance. This tree predicts better than the one found in a previous 
                                                 
13 See Appendix for crises grouping according to different varieties as proposed by Kaminsky (2003). 
14 Actually, there are five terminal nodes; four nodes characterizing crises observations and one featuring non-
crises.  
15 Of course, external factors, such as impairing in the terms of trade, may have influenced the behavior of 
exports and the fiscal deficit.  AAEP 05  9 
 
paper (see Amado, Cerro and Meloni, 2004) with contemporaneous variables as indicators, 
for the period 1885-2002. Nonetheless, both results are pretty much alike, since Fiscal Deficit 
is the variable that gets the first split of the data and Bank Deposit Growth and Real 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation are also splitters. 
The overall importance of variables, based on the contribution that predictors make to the 
construction of the tree, is presented in table 2. 
Table 2. Overall Importance of Variables. 
Variable Importance 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1)  100.00% 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (-1)  80,95% 
Bank Deposits Growth  71,15% 
External Debt/Exports (-1)  54,90% 
Nominal LIBOR  39,28% 
GDP Growth  19,41% 
Excess Real M1 Balances (% GDP)  10,03% 
Exports Growth  0,53% 
Domestic Credit (% GDP)  0,41% 
Finding cocktails ingredients  
As already mentioned, the Regression Tree Classification Technique found four recipes for 
explosive cocktails. Notice that the results are crisis years and not crises. That is, a given 
crisis episode lasting two or three-year may have one recipe for one year and a different mix 
of variables for the others. The resulting cocktail formulas are the following:  
First Split: High Fiscal Deficit 
The first split of the data is carried out on the fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP (lagged 
once). If this variable exceeds 4.4% (observations with fiscal deficit higher than the 79.3 
percentile), then that year should be considered as crisis year. We identify 27 crisis years 
that fulfill that condition: 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1875, 1876, 1884, 1885, 1931, 1947, 
1950, 1957, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1988 and 1989. Notice that high fiscal deficit was the only ingredient to make an 
“explosive cocktail” in those years. No other condiment was needed to generate a crisis, 
neither “domestic” nor “imported”. This variety of crises is consistent with first generation 
models and the probability of crisis in this final node is 54%. 
Second Split: mixing moderate Fiscal Deficit with Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
For those cases with moderate Fiscal Deficit to GDP ratio (less than 4.4%), there is a 
new split in the subgroup, performed by Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation lagged one 
period. If the real exchange rate overvaluation (-1) is in the 15.7 percentile or lower, we 
have another final node with 13 crises year: 1919, 1930, 1938, 1948, 1949, 1961, 1962, 
1970, 1971, 1991, 2000, 2001 and 2002. That is, mixing moderate fiscal deficit/GDP with 
RER Overvaluation results in a new explosive cocktail. The probability of crisis of this 
node is 53%.  
Third Split: moderate Fiscal Deficit, no RER Overvaluation plus strong decline in Real 
Bank Deposits  
For those observations with no problems of real appreciation (observations with real 
exchange rate overvaluation lagged once, higher than the 15.7 percentile), the new split 
comes from Bank Deposits Growth. If real deposits fall more than 22.8% we have AAEP 05  10 
 
another final node with 7 year crises: 1838, 1840, 1846, 1890, 1891, 1914 and 1990. 
Thus, another explosive mix is made with moderate fiscal deficit/GDP plus huge decline 
in real deposits. The probability of crisis in this node is 75%.   
Fourth Split: moderate Fiscal Deficit, no RER Overvaluation, mild Real Deposits 
decline and high External Debt to Export ratio  
Finally, if real deposit decline less than 22.8%, the sample is split again by the ratio of 
external debt to exports (lagged once), with a threshold of 5.2. For values greater than 
5.2 (external debt in the 90-percentile or higher), we identify 3 crisis years: 1987, 1994 
and 1995. That is, the last cocktail formula combines moderate fiscal deficit/GDP, mild 
(for Argentina) fall in real deposits and high external debt to exports ratio. The probability 
of crisis is 100%.  
In the following diagram we have assign each crisis year to the four explosive cocktails and 
consider consecutive crises years as belonging to the same crisis episode. We have 10 
crises in the first split  (High Fiscal deficit), 4 of them corresponding to the XIX century crises. 
In the second split (Moderate Fiscal Deficit plus RER Overvaluation) we have 5 crises as well 
as in the third split (Moderate Fiscal deficit, plus Strong Decline in Real Deposits) and only 
one in the forth split (Moderate Fiscal deficit, Modest Decline in Real Deposits plus High 
External Debt to Exports ratio) 
The intersections of splits stem from episodes with two or three crisis year belonging to 
different splits. For example, the 1930/31 crisis episode, worldwide known as the great 
depression, has one crisis year (1930) identified as coming from the second split and the 
other (1931) from the first split.  
Figure 2. Crises and Recipes 
 AAEP 05  11 
 
Regression Tree and the MTI  
The resulting rate of misclassification for the entire group of observations is relatively low, 
25%. Moreover, as soon as we analyze each case separately, we found that there is only a 
small discrepancy between regression tree classification and MTI identification.  
Misclassified data comes from three sources: (a) some crisis years were identified as non-
crisis for the MTI presumably because some component of the MTI was lacking and avoided 
a correct classification, like the international reserves and the interest rates for 1823-1875 
and the interest rate for 1940-1980; (b) for some other cases, the explanatory variables 
included in the Regression Tree indicate the existence of a crisis the year before the MTI 
components start to move (i.e. devaluation, reserves  drainage, or scaling interest rates). It 
can be said that MTI is a good technique to identify crisis but fails as an early warning 
indicator. (c) There are also a few cases where the MTI signals a crisis but the Regression 
Tree technique denies it, but those are mostly the years included as “preceding years” and 
not properly crises years identified for the MTI.  
Robustness. 
In designing a classification tree, the ultimate goal is to produce a tree whose probability of 
error be, as close as possible, to the Bayes probability error. Table 3 shows the 
misclassification for the training dataset and the misclassification for the trees built for cross-
validation. There are 31 misclassified crisis years for training data and 45 misclassified crisis 
years for cross-validation. The sensitivity analysis performed suggests a misclassification 
rate that stabilizes around 25%
16.   
Since the definition of crises years is exogenous (taken from the MTI) and there are missing 
values in the sample, we check for robustness of the results. As a robustness check, we 
have varied the predictor variable using only the crises years suggested by the MTI and the 
crises years plus the two years preceding the crisis year. We have also conducted similar 
regression tree analysis for the period from 1885 to 2002 and for different percentages of the 
original sample (1823-2002) selected randomly
17. The qualitative results are broadly similar, 
that is, none of the important results (fiscal deficit and real exchange rate overvaluation) are 
affected.  
Table 3. Misclassification for Training Data and Cross-Validation. Summary Table. 
Misclassification for Training data  Misclassification for Cross-Validation 
 
Crisis No-Crisis Total Crisis  No-Crisis  Total 
Predicted  Crisis 50 16 66  41  21  62 
Predicted No-Crisis  15  99  114  24  94  118 
Total 65  115  180  65  115  180 
 
IV. EVALUATING CRISES COSTS 
The most common and obvious consequences of crises are short-run output drops. But there 
are also other effects on the country’s production function inputs and on the total factor 
productivity that may have longer run impacts, such as diminishes in the human capital 
stock, institutional changes and income distribution worsening. By hurting some key inputs, 
crises might have delay effects or sequels that increase the probability of having a new and 
more severe crisis in the near future. The Dornbusch quotation, at the beginning of the 
paper, is very illustrative on this point.  
                                                 
16 See figure 1A  in the Appendix. 
17 We thank Andrew Nobel, Phillip Sherrod and Richard Olshen for comments and suggestions on this issue.  AAEP 05  12 
 
A complete evaluation of the cost of crises requires a careful examination of the impacts to 
avoid double counting
18.  
The influence of crises on the income distribution has received a great deal of attention. 
Recently, Halac and Schmuckler (2004) describes five channels through which currency 
crises impact on income distribution
19.  
The Output channel. The contraction of the economic activity causes a reduction in labor 
demand, particularly in the demand of unskilled workers. Moreover, the situation aggravates 
since the poor (mostly unskilled) generally have limited or no access to credit markets and 
lack assets to hedge against employment shocks. The recent 2001/02 crisis brought about a 
15% decrease in real GDP and pushed vast sectors of the population below the poverty line.  
The Inflation Channel. A high inflation is usually present in both, the process that ends up in 
a crisis and in the resolution of the crisis. The inflation tax deteriorates mainly the wealth and 
income of the poor. For example, the 1989/91 crash, that features hyperinflation, resulted in 
unprecedented poverty record in Argentina.  
The Relative Prices channel. Currency depreciation, intrinsically associated with crises, 
increases the price of tradable relative to non-tradable goods. These changes in relative 
prices hurt the poor via fall in real wages. As currency depreciates, the prices of export 
goods and import goods go up with the consequent impact on wages.  
The Public Spending channel. Once the crisis is in progress, the government usually cuts 
spending to close the fiscal gap that frequently characterizes crises episodes. Public 
spending cuts affect the provision of social services such as education, health and social 
programs aimed at the poor. As the public expenditure diminishes, the demand for labor gets 
affected both, directly through cuts in government temporary labor contracts, and indirectly  
via layoffs in firms suppliers of goods and services for the public sector. 
The Financial channel. The resolution of crises usually entails huge bailouts from non-
participants to participants of the financial sector. The devaluation of the peso announced in 
January 2002 would have meant the bankruptcy for many debtors, since 70% of the banking 
system’s loan were denominated in dollars, the authorities decreed the conversion of the 
dollar debts to peso debts at the rate exchange rate that prevailed before the devaluation 
(one dollar equal to one peso) implying a 32 billons dollars transfer to borrowers. 
There are some other variables affected by economic crises that have received considerably 
less attention, like migration and institutions, that might be very important in the case of 
Argentina:  
The Migration channel. Crashes and the astonishing series of crises, change relative 
wages (domestic versus international) provoking “tradable human capital” to emigrate. The 
migration of skilled labor decreases human capital stock and affects the production function 
of the country. 
The institutional channel. We can also conjecture that institutions, the humanly devised 
constrained that structure political and economic interaction, as defined by North (1991), 
affect and are affected by crises. Simple inspection of the historical data shows that 
cornerstones institutions, like democracy, the constitution of the country, and the 
independence of the judiciary resulted hurt, sometimes severely, few months after the 
beginning of most of very deep crises (or crashes). Table 4 seems to confirm the conjecture 
although linking these variables needs more theoretical and empirical work.   
                                                 
18 Schady (2002) analyzing the effects of the profound macroeconomic crisis in Peru in 1988–92 on the 
schooling and employment decisions made by urban school-age children founds that mean educational 
attainment was significantly higher for children who were exposed to the crisis than for those who were not. 
19 We borrowed freely from Halac and Schmukler. AAEP 05  13 
 
Interestingly, the six Very Deep Crises identified through the MTI were followed either by 
coup d’état (1930; 1976) or resignation before the president’s term expires (Rivadavia in 
1827; Juárez Celman in 1890; Alfonsín in 1989 and De la Rúa in 2001).  
Again, following North (1991), if institutions were “devised to create order and reduce 
uncertainty”, then we can conjecture that the interruption or de facto modification of rules 
generates disorder and uncertainty, which may weaken the economy and make the country 
prone to further crisis. Although we do not establish a formal and precise link between crises 
and institutional deterioration, it is also difficult to disregard a causal relationship between 
one crisis and the following, and the institutional channel arise as a good candidate to 
explain that apparent relationship. 
 
Table 4. Crisis and Political events 





Changes in the Executive 
Months between changes in  








27  na  President Rivadavia resigned July 
7, 1827  *   Very  Deep 
1890-
91  na 
President Juárez Celman resigned 
Aug 6, 1990 
** No  Very  Deep 
1929-
31  March 1929 
Coup d’état (Yrigoyen) 
Sep 6, 1930 
19 No  Very  Deep 
1955 Oct  1955 
Coup d’état (Perón) 
Sep 16, 1955 
-1 Yes  Mild 
1962 Jan  1962 
Coup d’état (Frondizi) 
March 28, 1962 
3 Yes  Mild 
1971 June  1971 
Lanusse substitutes Levingston 
March 22, 1971 
-3 ****  Mild 
1975-
76  July 1974 
Coup d’état (Martínez) 
March 24, 1976 
21 Yes  Very  Deep 
1981-
82  Dec 1980 
Galtieri substitutes Viola 
Dec 11, 1981 
12 ****  Mild 
1989-
90-91  Jan 1989 
President Alfonsín resigned 
July 8, 1989 
6  No *****  Very Deep 
2001-
2002  Oct 2000 
President De la Rúa resigned 
Dec 20, 2001 
15 No******  Very  Deep 
Notes: * Rivadavia resigned after the 1826/27 crisis began, but we cannot establish the number of months between the two 
events since the crisis was identified with annual data.  
** Juárez Celman resigned after the 1899/91 crisis began, but we cannot establish the number of months between the two 
events since the crisis was identified with annual data 
*** Removed by another de facto government.  
**** De Facto government 
***** President Menen did not change the members of the Supreme Court, but increases the number of them from 5 to 9, which 
implicitly conditioned the Court. 
****** President Kirchner (elected in 2003) removed various members of the Court appealing to constitutional mechanisms. 
 
Computing Output loss 
A rough assessment of the costs of the argentine crises  in terms of lost output can be easily 
calculated by following three steps:  
(a) Compute  the  trend of the GDP growth 
(b)  Compare GDP growth after a crisis with GDP growth trend.  AAEP 05  14 
 
(c)  The cost in lost output is then estimated by adding up the difference between trend 
growth and actual growth in the years following the crisis until the time when annual 
output growth returned to its trend. 
Likewise, we can also compute the recovery time from any given crisis, that is, how long it 
takes to the GDP growth to return to the trend GDP growth.  
Table 5 Panels A and B exhibits the results for the periods 1823-1913 (crises computed from 
annual data) and 1914-2003 (crises computed from monthly data) respectively. It must be 
remarked that crises costs for 1823-1884 were estimated from fiscal revenues since GDP is 
not available for that period. Panel B features besides the duration of currency crises as 
obtained from the MTI fluctuations. 
It must also be underlined that Argentina’s GDP growth record changes dramatically through 
time so we compute trend GDP growth for various sub periods. Whereas this procedure is 
correct to avoid omitting mild crises, it obliges us to be cautious when comparing crises costs 
from different sub periods.  
 
Table 5. Panel A. Cumulative Output Loss and Recovery Time: 1823- 1913 
Crisis  Crises Classification 
according to MTI  




1826/27 Very  Deep  8.3  3 
1829/30  Mild  No cost   - 
1839/40 Deep  4.7  1 
1846 Mild  2.2  1 
1876 Mild  No  cost  - 
1885 Deep  5.8  1 
1889/91 Very  Deep  28.1  2 
Source: Cerro and Meloni (2003) and own calculations. 
Note: From 1823 to 1884, cumulative output loss were estimated by computing cumulative fiscal revenue losses. 
 
Despite the previous caveat about comparisons it seems reasonable to sustain that the 
1890-91 crisis was the most important during the XIX century. During the 1887-1889 
Argentina was speeding up at outrageous rates, what explains the magnitude of the crash. 
The first crisis of the XX century, occurred in 1914, associated to the end of almost 14 years 
of convertibility under the gold standard regime, and preceded by the “golden years” of the 
centenary was very expensive too (15.8%). But, the dearest crisis in the first half of the 
century was the one related to the great depression, from 1929 to 1931, not only due to the 
enormous cumulative output loss (almost 24%) but also because recovery time was three 
years.  
As the country’s trend of the GDP growth diminished, and crises repeated with certain 
regularity, costs became relatively low. That is why, crises classified as very deep by the 
MTI, like the 1974/76 and 1989/91, cost “only” 6.5% and 7% respectively. At the beginning of 
the XX century the country fell from high levels of GDP growth trend, while at the end of the 
century it fell from very modest GDP growth trend. For example, the 1989/91 crisis was the 
culmination of a decade characterized by continuous crises and consequently poor 
performance measured by output growth. Hence, recovering the GDP growth to the levels 
prevailing previous to the crash demanded a relatively small increase in output.  
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1914 3  Deep  15.8  1 
1918/19 10  Mild  No  cost  - 
1920/21 11  Mild  No  cost  - 
1929/31 22 Very  Deep  23.7  3 
1937/38 14  Mild  2.8  1 
1948/49 16  Deep  5.1  1 
1951 8 Mild  8.8  1 
1955/56 4  Mild  1.0  1 
1958 10  Deep  10.3  1 
1962 10  Deep  9.6  2 
1964/65 13  Mild  No  cost  - 
1971/72 14  Deep  1.1  1 
1974/76 21 Very  Deep  6.5  2 
1980/82 24  Deep  9.7  2 
1983/85 22  Mild  7.0  1 
1986/88 23  Deep  2.3  1 
1989/91 26 Very  Deep  7.0  2 
1994/95 4  Mild  5.1  1 
2000/2002 25  Very  Deep  23.0  3 
Source: Cerro and Meloni (2003) and own calculations. 
 
We also conduct a comparison among the costs involved in each of the four nodes of the 
regression tree. That is, we want to know which is the cost of each type of crisis and, of 
course, which is the most expensive mix. Table 7 exhibits the cumulative output loss of each 
“explosive cocktail”. Due to data availability, we computed the costs of crises from 1875 to 
2002. When episodes involve more than one crisis year belonging to different mixes we 
compute the average cost. 
 












Deficit + strong 
decline in Real Bank 
Deposits 
Node 9 
Moderate Fiscal Deficit + mild 
Real Deposits decline + high 
External Debt to Export ratio 
Number of Crises 
years   22 13  4  3 
Total cost  63.8  53.5  35.5  5.9 
Average cost  2.9  4.1  8.9  2.0 
 
Crises in Node 3 (the high fiscal deficit type) are the most frequent, with total costs close to 
64%, but its average cost is “only” 2.9%.  AAEP 05  16 
 
The dearest crises, with 8.9% cumulative output loss are Node 6 crises, which combines 
Moderate Fiscal Deficit plus strong decline in Real Bank Deposits, presumably entailing 
banking crises. On the other hand, the average cost of crises that mix moderate fiscal deficit 
with RER overvaluation is 4.1%, while Node 9 combining moderate fiscal deficit, mild real 
deposits decline and high external debt to exports ratio is 2%, perhaps due to the small 
numbers of cases. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
High Fiscal Deficit, Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation, Bank Deposit Growth Rate decline 
and high ratio of External Debt to Exports are the key ingredients of the 26 explosive 
cocktails that poisoned Argentina from independence days to the present. A touch of import 
condiment like an increasing LIBOR is also needed.  
We found four crisis recipes, having fiscal deficit as the common factor in all mixes. The first 
one includes only extremely high fiscal deficits which predict a crisis with 54% of probability. 
This is the most frequent type of crisis in Argentina and its average cost, measure as the 
cumulative output lost per crisis year, is relatively moderate (2.9%) 
When combining moderate fiscal deficits with real exchange rate overvaluation the 
probability of crisis remains around 53% and the average cost climbs to 4.1%. On the other 
hand, mixing moderate fiscal deficit with huge declines in the rate of growth of real deposits 
produces the dearest crises (average cost is 8.9%) and the probability of crisis increases to 
75%. Finally, there a few cases of low-cost cocktails (average cost is 2%) having moderate 
fiscal deficits and high external debt to ratio exports as the main ingredients but the 
probability of crisis when this combination is present is 100%. 
Results are very robust and reinforce the ones obtained by Cerro and Meloni (2003), that 
relied on a set of non-parametric tests and macroeconomic variables analysis in the 
neighborhood of the crises to conclude on the characteristics of argentine crises, and by 
Amado, Cerro and Meloni, (2004) that performed graphical analysis, probit regressions and 
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Appendix 
Market Turbulence Index 
The index was computed with monthly data from 1914 to 2002. We imposed different criteria 
to sort crises, but whenever the MTI is greater than the mean (µ) plus k standard deviations 
(STD) we identify a “signal” or “turbulent episode”. We require at least two “close” months 
with MTI greater than the mean value plus three STD to consider that episode as deep crisis 
or “crash”. If the MTI is greater than µ µ µ µ plus two STD but less than µ µ µ µ plus three STD, we call it 
“mild crisis”. If MTI exceeds its mean value in a half STD at least twice the episode is 
considered “minor turbulence”. The remaining episodes, i.e. when the index departs less 
than one half standard deviation from the average are termed as “non- crisis” or tranquility 
times. In high inflation episodes (1976 and 1989), we excluded the data for the estimation of 
the moments, to preclude these data distort the “signals”. In order to determine the 
boundaries of a given crisis and so avoiding dating twice the same crisis, we require at least 
six months with no signals between each other. 
With annual data, we arbitrarily classified an episode as “mild crisis” when the market 
turbulence index exceeds one and a half standard deviations from the mean value in a given 
year. If MTI is greater than two STD we say that the crisis is “deep” and if MTI only exceeds 
its mean value in one STD, we term that episode as “minor turbulence”. It is worth remarking 
that the terms “tranquility”, “mild”, “deep” and “very deep” are referred to the sub period 
considered and does not intent to be an absolute qualification for the whole period.  
Table 1A. Panel A. Criteria to sort Crises. Monthly Data 
Criteria 
Index  # of Signals 
Classification 
MTI < 0.5 σMTI   Non-  crisis 
0.5 σMTI<MTI< 2 σMTI  Two close months  Mild 
2  σMTI <MTI < 3 σMTI  Two close months  deep 
MTI > 3 σMTI  Two close months  Very Deep 
Table 1A. Panel B. Criteria to sort Crises. Annual Data 
Criteria Classification 
MTI < σMTI  Non- crisis 
σMTI <MTI < 1.5 σMTI  Mild 
1.5 σMTI <MTI < 2 σMTI  Deep 
MTI > 2 σMTI  Very Deep 
 
The  MTI was computed for six sub periods in order to keep its variance relatively 
homogeneous. Sub periods were chosen by political, economical and historical events.  
(a) From the Independence to the National Organization: 1823 - 1861 
(b) From the National Organization to the First World War: 1862- 1913 
(c) The Interwar Period: 1914- 1945  
(d)  From Perón to Perón: 1946- 1976  
(e)  From Hyper to Hyper Inflation: 1976- 1991  
(f)   Convertibility: from boom to burst: 1992 – 2002 AAEP 05  19 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for The Bayes Probability of Error 
































































































Varieties of Currency Crises  
Following Kaminsky (2003) we classify each node in different varieties: 
 















3  Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1) > 4.425%  *         54% Crisis 
4 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1) < 4.425% 
RER Overvaluation (-1) < -0.237   *       53% Crisis 
6 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1) < 4.425% 
RER Overvaluation (-1) > -0.237 
Bank Deposits Growth < -22.81% 





Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1) < 4.425% 
RER Overvaluation (-1) > -0.237 
Bank Deposits Growth > -22.81% 
External Debt/Exports (-1) < 5.17 






Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) (-1) < 4.425% 
RER Overvaluation (-1) > -0.237 
Bank Deposits Growth > -22.81% 
External Debt/Exports (-1) > 5.17 








Note: The * indicates to which variety of crises each group belongs 
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International Comparisons 
In a recent study that covers the 1975-1997 period, the IMF (1998) accounts for 158 financial 
crises from 53 countries (22 industrial countries and 31 developing countries). Crises were 
classified in three categories, currency crashes, Banking crises, and Currency and banking 
crises (usually called twin crises). It is worth noting that IMF estimations may be biased 
downward because instances where output growth did not return to trend over the sample 
period were excluded from the calculations. 
 
Table 4A. Costs of Crisis 1970-1998 















losses per crisis (in 
percentage points) 
4 
Currency Crises   158  1.6  4.3  61  7.1 
Industrial 42  1.9  3.1  55  5.6 
Emerging 116  1.5  4.8  64  7.6 
Currency Crashes 
  55 2.0  7.1  71  10.1 
Industrial 13  2.1  5.0  62  8.0 
Emerging 42  1.9  7.9  74  10.7 
Banking Crises   54  3.1  11.6  82  14.2 
Industrial 12  4.1  10.2  67  15.2 
Emerging 42  2.8  12.1  86  14.0 
Twin Crises
6  32 3.2  14.4 78  18.5 
Industrial 6  5.8  17.6  100  17.6 
Emerging 26  2.6  13.6  73  18.8 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF (1998) and own calculations 
Notes: (1) Average amount of time until GDP growth returned to trend. Because GDP growth data are available 
for all countries only on annual basis, by construction the minimum recovery time was one year 
(2) Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crises began until 
the time when annual output returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises 
(3) Percent of crises  
(4) Calculated by summing the difference between trend growth after the crises began until the time when annual 
output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses. 
(5) Currency crashes are identified by crises where the currency component of the exchange market pressure 
index accounts for 75% or more of the index when the index signals a crisis. 
(6) Identified when banking crises occurred within a year of currency crisis. 